London bank account case

By Francis Joseph, Trinidad Newsday

FORMER Prime Minister Basdeo Panday lost his constitutional motion yesterday in which he was asking the court to stay his trial on charges of failing to declare his London bank account to the Integrity Commission. Madame Justice Maureen Rajnauth-Lee, presiding in the Port-of-Spain Fifth Civil Court, dismissed Panday’s motion and ordered that he pay costs to the Attorney General. The judge dismissed all four grounds raised by Panday, clearing the way for Chief Magistrate Sherman Mc Nicolls to proceed with the summary court trial on March 22. She said that although the Integrity in Public Life Act 1987 was repealed, the matter was alive and legal proceedings against Panday could continue.

Allan Alexander SC, Desmond Allum SC, Fyard Hosein SC, and Devesh Maharaj appeared for Panday, while Dr Lloyd Barnett, Douglas Mendes, and Sean Julien represented the Attorney General. Panday was charged by Senior Supt Wellington Virgil, Head of the Fraud Squad, with failing to declare to the Integrity Commission, money held in an account at the National Westminster Bank, London, in his name and that of his wife Oma for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999. But before the matter could begin in the Magistrates’ Court, Panday’s attorneys requested the Chief Magistrate to refer the matter to the High Court on the ground that the proceedings were in contravention of Section 4(a) of the constitution. Panday was seeking a declaration that the preferring of three charges against him was unconstitutional, invalid, null and void and of no effect in that it contravened his fundamental rights to liberty and the enjoyment of property.

The Opposition leader also sought a declaration that the three summonses dated September 18, 2002 were unconstitutional, invalid, null and void and of no effect. Panday wanted an order for the charges to be dismissed and that the hearing of the matter before the Chief Magistrate be stayed pending the final determination of this motion. When contacted yesterday, Panday said he would leave the legal proceedings up to his lawyers whom he felt were more competent to deal with the case. The first issue was whether there was a constitutional cause of action. Justice Rajnauth-Lee asked, "has there been, is there being or is there likely to be, any contravention of the applicant’s (Panday) right to due process, to the protection of the law or any other fundamental human right by the preferring of the charges against him?" After reviewing legal authorities, Justice Rajnauth-Lee found that there was no contravention or threatened contravention of any of Panday’s fundamental human rights by the preferring of the charges or the prosecution of the summonses against him.

The judge found it was an abuse of the process of the court that the jurisdiction of the High Court was restricted solely to the determination of the questions referred to the court by the Chief Magistrate. "In every matter in which an applicant alleges that his constitutional rights are being infringed, the applicant must consider the true nature of the right which he claims is being infringed, and once there is some other procedure or mechanism either under the common law or pursuant to statute available to him, resort to the constitution under section 14 will be appropriate," the judge added. The next question was whether Panday could be charged for offences allegedly committed against the Integrity in Public Life Act 1987 after six months had elapsed since the commission of the offences? Justice Rajnauth-Lee said it had been argued that the statutory limit for laying the charges was six months and no more from the date when the offence was committed.

She added, "it would indeed be an absurdity that a tribunal could be appointed by the President and an inquiry commenced, but no charges could be laid against the person in public life because six months had elapsed since the making of the false declaration." Justice Rajnauth-lee ordered that the charges laid against Panday were properly done. She said although the 1987 Act was repealed, the preferring of the charges was valid. "Neither does it affect any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any obligation or liability incurred under the written law and any such investigation may be instituted, continued, or enforced as if the written law had not been repealed."