Lawyer tells judge... 'Too late to try Panday'

By FRANCIS JOSEPH

SENIOR COUNSEL Allan Alexander said yesterday that three charges laid against former Prime Minister Basdeo Panday for failing to declare his London bank accounts were improperly filed because they were statute-barred, and therefore his client cannot be put on trial. Alexander said for the charges to be proper, they should have been filed within six months of the alleged offences, according to Section 33 (2) of the Summary Court Act. He said in one instance, one of the three charges was filed two years and 11 months after the six-month limitation period had expired. "On the basis of the clear and unambiguous provisions of Section 33 (2) of the Summary Courts Act, each of those complaints were improperly brought outside the period stipulated," Alexander argued. Alexander began his submissions yesterday before Madame Justice Maureen Rajnauth-Lee in the Port-of-Spain Second Civil Court in a constitutional motion brought by Panday, political leader of the United National Congress (UNC).

Panday is contending that his constitutional rights were or are likely to be infringed if the trial against him for allegedly failing to declare bank accounts held at the London Westminster Bank proceeds. Senior Supt Wellington Virgil, head of the Fraud Squad, filed three charges on September 18, 2002, against Panday under the Integrity in Public Life Act 1987. He is accused of failing to declare his assets for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999. In April, Chief Magistrate Sherman Mc Nicolls agreed to submissions by Alexander and referred the matter to the High Court for determination. As a result, the trial before the Chief Magistrate has been adjourned pending the final determination of the constitutional motion. Also appearing for Panday were Desmond Allum SC, Fyard Hosein, Rajiv Persad, and Devesh Maharaj. Representing the Attorney General were Jamaican attorney Dr Lloyd Barnett, Douglas Mendes and State attorney Rehanna Hosein. Hearing continues on November 24.

Alexander said the first question was whether all of the three charges were statute-barred. "If the answer is yes, will those complaints and summonses in each case constitute a contravention of due process? If the answer is yes, will those contraventions constitute deprivation or interference with the constitutional rights to the enjoyment of property and/or liberty?" he asked. Alexander continued, "We will submit that the answer is yes to each of those questions. Referring to Section 33 (2) of the Summary Courts Act, Alexander said the complaint against Panday should have been made within six months of the alleged offence. "A complaint laid one day after the expiration of the six-month period is inadmissible, null and void and as we say, statute-barred. It is submitted that Section 33 (2) of the Summary Courts Act provides that in every case where no time is specifically limited for the making of the case, the statutory limit for laying of the complaint is six months and no more." Alexander said the first offence was allegedly committed on April 9, 1999, but the charge was laid on September 18, 2002 - three years and five months later.

The second, he added, allegedly occurred between March 15 and 22, 2002, yet the complaint was laid on September 18, 2002. The third was allegedly committed between December 19 and 24, 1999, but the charge was laid on September 18, 2002. Alexander referred to the case for the Attorney General in which the State contends that Section 28 of the Integrity in Public Life Act 1987 was relevant and was a complete answer to his submission. But Alexander said this section deals with a period of five years after a person has left public life. He said this period is not linked to the commission of an offence, but linked to a person in public life and who has left. "In effect, Section 28 disenables the institution of proceedings for offences under the Integrity in Public Life Act 1987 after the expiration of five years. It creates immunity for such persons," Senior Counsel added. Alexander said both Section 33 (2) of the Summary Courts Act and Section 28 of the Integrity in Public Life Act 1987 were clear and unambiguous. He recited that Section 33 (2) prescribes a limit for making a complaint. Section 28 of the Integrity in Public Life Act, he added, makes provision for a time after which a complaint may not be instituted.

"The question is whether these complaints are likely to infringe or will infringe the guaranteed rights to the enjoyment of property and liberty without due process?" he asked. Alexander pointed out that Section 27 (1) of the Integrity in Public Life Act makes Panday liable to a fine of $20,000 and imprisonment of two years on each of the three charges. "There is a potential for infringing his right to the enjoyment of property in so far as the fines are concerned. We submit that there is also a potential for the infringement of his right to liberty by virtue of the provision of imprisonment. It is also our submission that the command to obey the summonses has already infringed his right to liberty. "In so far as the dates of the summonses are concerned, the applicant is required to attend. Whatever he may have wanted to do on those days, cannot be done. That constitutes to a denial of his liberty," he argued. When hearing resumes on November 24, Alexander will deal with the repeal of the Integrity in Public Life Act.

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